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Sixty Years In The Making: The
Definition of Aggression for the
International Criminal Court
By KEITH A. PETTY
I. Introduction
In the pre-dawn hours of June 25, 1950, a firestorm of artillery
gave cover to the North Korean army as it crossed the thirty-eighth
parallel into South Korea, thereby starting the Korean War. In
January 1991, American-led coalition forces attacked Iraqi targets in
response to President Saddam Hussein's invasion and annexation of
Kuwait. On the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen members
of the al Qaeda organization hijacked four commercial jets and used
them as weapons in coordinated attacks against targets within the
United States, killing 2,973 people. While each of these instances
involves the coercive use of force, only the first could be qualified as
criminal aggression, the second is collective defense, and the third is
uncertain.
The post-war trials of axis war criminals marked the last time
individuals were tried and punished for the aggressive. use of force.
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Today, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
provides for jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, but only when
that crime is defined. For the past sixty years, leading legal and
political minds have tried and failed to articulate a working definition.
But the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute is nearing
agreement on a draft crime of aggression.
Aggression is particularly difficult to define due to the political
nature of the crime. In fact, prior to the trial of the German Kaiser
following World War I, the Allies admitted that the indictment "has
not a juridical character as regard its substance, but only in its form.
The ex-Emperor is arraigned as a matter of high international
policy ... ." Besides the issue of "victor's justice," some criticize
attempts to define aggression on the ground that any definition
reached by consensus is irrelevant to the question of whether
aggression actually occurred.2 Others claim that modern aggression
continuously takes new forms and any present-day definition would
soon be obsolete or incomplete.3
Recent progress by the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression for the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute
("Special Working Group") proves that these efforts are anything but
futile. Not only is a definition required by the Rome Statute itself,
but no authoritative definition exists for the purposes of individual
criminal liability. Furthermore, the ability to prosecute this crime will
deter potential aggressors and facilitate the protection of the rights of
the victims of aggression.
Several legal issues must be resolved prior to reaching the
definition of aggression. Primarily, the issue of State responsibility
will be discussed in Section III in the context of the relationship
between the ICC and the Security Council, the nature of the acts
required to constitute aggression, and whether a specific list of acts is
preferred to a general definition. Second, individual criminal
1. William A. Schabas, Origins of the Criminalization of Aggression: How
Crimes Against Peace Became the "Supreme International Crime," in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 17, 21 (Mauro
Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004) (quoting Reply of the Allied and Associated
Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation and the Conditions of Peace,
Paris, 16 June 1919, HMSO, Misc. No. 4 (1919)). The Kaiser ultimately escaped
prosecution when he fled to the Netherlands. Id
2. ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION 4
(1972).
3. Id. at 5.
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responsibility, including the leadership requirement, the actus reus,
and the mens rea elements of the crime, will be discussed in Section
IV. Finally, Section V offers recommendations and concludes that
any definition should serve as a starting point for the prohibition of a
wider range of unlawful uses of force. Prior to the legal issues, a brief
discussion of the historical background of the legal regime regulating
the use of force, and the long road toward a definition of aggression
will assist in framing the relevant issues.
IL. Historical Background
The crime of aggression developed from the principles governing
the initiation of armed conflict among States, known as the jus ad
bellum. These principles were once known as the "just war" doctrine,
which has its roots in antiquity from 330 BCE to 300 CE and is closely
associated with the teachings of St. Augustine between 354-430 CE.4
Early Islamic traditions also recognized the just war concept, often
referred to as ihad, or the "struggle for what is right."5 Between
1226-1274 CE, St. Thomas Aquinas further developed the just war
concept by enumerating criteria for the just use of force.6
The modern legal theory of jus ad bellum took shape after the
devastation of WWI. The Assembly of the League of Nations7 and
the Kellogg-Briand Pact8 each made strides in prohibiting the
4. See DR. C.A. POMPE, AGGRESSIVE WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME 118-75
(The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 1953), for a detailed history of the "just war" doctrine
from Antiquity to Nuremburg. See also ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J.
BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER
PARADIGM 11-16 (Routledge 1993). See also IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 5 (Oxford University Press, 1963).
5. Charles Clinch, ihad. How It Can Save Just War Doctrine, UCLA
International Institute (2005), http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?
parentid=35780.
6. The three criteria are: the sovereign authority alone can declare war; there
must be a just cause - those attacked must somehow be at fault; and there must be a
just intent - the advancement of good or avoidance of harm. AREND & BECK, supra
note 4, at 14 (citing ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, Seconda Secundae,
Q. 40 (Art. 1), in A. D'ENTREVES, AQUINAS: SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS 159 (J.
Dawson trans. 1948)).
7. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 71, for a discussion of League
Assembly resolutions relating to aggression.
8. Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat.
2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]. For an in depth discussion of
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unlawful use of force as an extension of foreign policy among States;
these principles later embodied in article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.9
Although these instruments regulate State conduct without mention
of individual responsibility, they did advance international law
between 1919 and 1945 toward the criminality of aggression.
Not until after WWI did the international community seriously
undertake prosecuting aggression. Articles 228-230 of the Treaty of
Versailles contemplated prosecuting German combatants before
Allied military tribunals for the "violation of the laws and customs of
war."' Where these efforts failed, the post-WWII tribunals were
successful. Axis war criminals were prosecuted at the Nuremberg
Tribunal, the Tokyo Tribunal, and in the Subsequent Proceedings
under Control Council Law No. 10. While none of the implementing
documents of these tribunals specifically defined aggression, each
court was authorized to judge a) when a State had committed
aggressive acts, and b) when an individual was responsible for those
acts.
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, see BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 74-95. See also Steven R.
Ratner, Crimes Against Peace, in CRIMES OF WAR BOOK (Roy Gutman ed., W.W.
Norton & Company 1999), available at <http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/crimes-
against-peace.html>.
9. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. See also Schabas, supra note 1, at 29.
10. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers of Germany arts.
228-230, June 28, 1919, 225 C.T.S. 188, 285, 2 Bevans 43, 136-37 [hereinafter Treaty of
Versailles]. See also Schabas, supra note 1, at 19 (quoting JAMES F. WILLIS,
PROLOGUE TO NUREMBURG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR
CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1982), and SHELDON GLUECK, WAR
CRIMINALS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT (1944)).
11. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal Annexed to the London
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg
Charter]. See also Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,
Jan. 19, 1946, 1946 U.S.T. LEXIS 378, 4 Bevans 20, as amended on April 26, 1946, 4
Bevans 27, 31. See also Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty
of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, (1945), reprinted in
TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON
NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 250-253
(1949), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/NTfinal-report.html. The
prosecution of "crimes against peace" at these tribunals was heavily criticized as ex
post facto criminality in violation of the nullum crimen sine lege principle of legality.
Justice Robert Jackson, Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, argued that aggressive war
had been outlawed since 1920 by the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Stimson Note of 1932,
the Geneva Protocols, and Resolutions by the Assembly of the League of Nations
and the Conference of American States. These arguments were ultimately accepted
by the courts. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment (1946), 1
I.M.T. 171, 219-20 [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment], available at
[Vol. 31:2
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Since these tribunals, there have been numerous efforts to define
aggression. Most notably, the 1954 International Law Commission
Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind,'2
the 1974 General Assembly Resolution 3314,'13 and the 199114 and
199615 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind (1996 ICL Draft Code).
In 1998 the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court
was adopted, calling for the prosecution of genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression once it has been
defined. 6  The Preparatory Commission was then responsible for
defining aggression for the Court. In July 2002, the requisite number
of States ratified the Rome Statute, thereby giving it legal affect and
ending the mandate of the Preparatory Commission. 7 Since then, the
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute took over and
designated a Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression.
The Special Working Group has several hurdles to overcome
before it can submit a final draft definition to the Assembly of States
Parties. First, there is a limited amount of time for delegates of States
Parties to meet and work on the draft, an issue that also plagued the
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc.htm>. The Tokyo Tribunal and the
Subsequent Proceedings similarly upheld the criminality of aggression. YORAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 121 (Cambridge University Press,
2nd ed., 1994) (citing In re Hirota and Others, [1948] A.D. 356, 362-3 (Tokyo, 1948),
and U.S.A. v. Von Weizsaecker et al. (Ministries Case), 14 N.M.T 314, 318-22
(Nuremberg, 1949)). See also BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 167-68.
12. Int'l Law Comm'n, Second Report on a Draft Code of Offences against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/44 (April 12, 1951) (prepared by
J, Spiropoulos, Special Rapporteur.)
13. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), annex, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). While this
definition of aggression is intended to assist the Security Council's political
determination of aggression, it has been relied on heavily in the subsequent efforts to
draft a criminal provision for aggression.
14. Int'l Law Comm'n, Ninth Report on a Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/435 and Add.1 (February 8 and
March 15, 1991) (prepared by Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur).
15. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, with commentaries, repintedin [1996] Y.B. Int'l L. C[0]omm'n, vol. 11 (2),
para. 50, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 and Corr.1 and 3, (1996) [hereinafter 1996 ILC
Draft Code].
16. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183.9 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
17. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, History of the ICC,
<http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory> (visited Jan. 29, 2008).
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Preparatory Commission."8 Articles 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute
allow for amendments to be made to the Statute seven years after it
comes into force - July 2009.9 Between now and the 2009 Review
Conference, the Assembly of States Parties only have about two
weeks to work since they only meet for five to seven days a year.20
Second, and more significantly, there are several legal issues that
remain contentious among the delegates. The four most pressing
issues include: 1) The role of the Security Council vis-A-vis the Court,
2) deciding when State conduct reaches the level of aggression (the
"threshold" issue); 3) including specific acts or drafting a general
definition, and 4) the distinction between State responsibility and
individual culpability." The following sections address each of these
issues in turn.
III. State Responsibility and Aggressive Acts:
Preconditions to ICC Jurisdiction
The Nuremberg Charter directly links State obligations under
international law to individual accountability. This same approach is
seen in recent efforts to define aggression.23 As a result, the ratione
materiae of the crime of aggression has two parts. First, there must
be an aggressive act by a State. Second, an individual must commit
acts which set in motion the State aggression, as discussed in Section
IV below. Even though the ICC exercises jurisdiction over
individuals and not States, an individual cannot invade another
country. Conversely, States do not commit aggression in a vacuum.
18. Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, Report of the CICC Team on Aggression,
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Third Session, The Hague, 6-10 September 2004, UNION INTERNATIONALE DES
AVOCATS (October 14, 2004).
19. Rome Statute, supra note 16, arts. 121, 123.
20. Press Conference by Chairman of Working Group on Crime of Aggression
(Jan. 31, 2007), <http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/070131_Wenaweser.
doc. htm> [hereinafter Press Conference].
21. MICHAEL ROSEBERRY, Defining Aggression: An Analysis of the Existing
Approaches and a Proposal, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND PUNISHMENT,
SELECTED ISSUES 35 (Sienho Yee ed., 2003).
22. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 11.
23. See 1996 ILC Draft Code, supra note 15, at 42-43. See also U.N. Preparatory
Comm'n for the ICC, Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International
Criminal Court (continued), Addendum Part II, Proposals for a provision on the
crime of aggression, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2 (July 24, 2002) [hereinafter
PrepComm Report].
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Only regime elites and persons of influence initiate the machinations
of unlawful force. This section discusses the determination of State
aggression and the role of the Security Council in relation to the ICC.
A. Aggressive State Conduct as a Political Decision
There is general consensus that there cannot be individual
responsibility for aggression unless the State in question has
committed an act of aggression.2' It is widely held that the ICC may
come into play only once there has been such a determination."
Under the U.N. Charter framework, the U.N. Security Council is
responsible for determining which acts constitute aggression. 6 The
issue remains whether State aggression is a purely political question
for the Security Council or whether the Court may act on its own.2 7
The Chairman to the Special Working Group clearly presented these
two options in his discussion paper: "Where the Security Council does
not make such a determination within [six] months after the date of
notification, Option 1: the court may proceed with the case, Option 2:
the court may not proceed with the case."28
During the meetings of the Preparatory Commission and the
Assembly of States Parties, some argued that there is no legal or
practical basis for limiting ICC jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression to decisions made by the Security Council.29  This
24. Mauro Politi, The Debate within the Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE
CRIME OF AGGRESSION 43, 49 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
25. See INT'L CRIM. Cr., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed fifth session,
Discussion Paper Proposed by the Chairman, T 4, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2, (January
29-Feb. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Discussion Papej, which states:
[w]here the Prosecutor intends to proceed with an investigation in respect of
a crime of aggression, the Court shall first ascertain whether the Security
Council has made a determination of an act of aggression committed by the
State concerned. If no Security Council determination exists, the Court shall
notify the Security Council of the situation before the Court.
Id. See also Politi, supra note 24, at 49. For the historical basis for determinations of
aggression by the League of Nations, see POMPE, supra note 4, at 73.
26. U.N. Charter art. 39.
27. Dr. Pompe framed the issue in the following way: "Whatever higher
principles or sociological laws politics may obey, its essence remains the free decision,
while the essence of law is the binding rule." POMPE, supra note 4, at 85.
28. Discussion Paper, supra note 25, at 4.
29. Umberto Leanza, The Historical Background, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 3, 14 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe
Nesi eds., 2004). See also INT'L CRIM. Cr., Assembly of States Parties, Resumed fifth
session, Annex II, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression,
2008]
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argument finds its strongest support among Arab and developing
countries.'o The ICC must remain independent, they contend,
regarding determinations of State aggression and the consequences in
the field of individual criminal responsibility. 3  This puts the
responsibilities of the two bodies in stark contrast. While the Security
Council is aimed at governing State conduct that disturbs
international peace and security, the ICC deals with the
responsibilities of an individual actor. Furthermore, the ICC is not a
U.N. body, regardless of the "special relationship" between them.32
This means that it should be more autonomous in its operations.
Professor Giorgio Gaja does not foresee a conflict between an
independent ICC and the role of the Security Council. He argues:
One cannot assume that the absence of a finding by the Security
Council that aggression occurred necessarily implies that in the
Security Council's view there is no aggression and that therefore a
conflict would arise with a positive finding b , the ICC that an
individual has committed a crime of aggression.
In fact, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") does not limit
its own jurisdiction or decision-making in such a way, and could at
times interfere with the measures the Security Council adopts under
its Chapter VII powers.' The Nuremburg Tribunal was also not
limited in this way. Under the Nuremberg Charter, the tribunal
determined whether a State committed aggressive acts without a prior
determination by an international organization.35
The ICTY encounters related issues. Prior to establishing
individual criminal responsibility in the Tadic case, the court first had
to determine whether the nature of the conflict was internal or
international.' Similarly, in a Rule 61 decision in Raic, the Trial
25, ICC-ASP/5/35, (Jan. 29-Feb. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Report of the Special
Working Group].
30. Leanza, supra note 29, at 14.
31. Id.
32. 1996 ILC Draft Code, supra note 15, at 43.
33. Giorgio Gaja, The Respective Roles of the ICC and the Security Council in
Determining the Existence of an Aggression, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 121, 124 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi
eds., 2004).
34. Leanza, supra note 29, at 14.
35. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 11, art. 6. See also POMPE, supra note 4,
at 76.
36. Marja Lehto, The ICC and the Security Council: About the Argument of
Politicization, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF
[Vol. 31:2
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Chamber found that Croatia's support of Bosnian Croats against
Bosnian forces was sufficient to make the case "in the context of an
international armed conflict," thus establishing jurisdiction.37 This
decision was reached without effect as to Croatia's responsibility.'
But the ICTY did not have to deal with the crime of aggression,
which is considerably more politicized because it requires a finding of
State responsibility.39
Since the Rome Conference, the permanent members of the
Security Council maintain that there must be a Security Council
finding of aggression prior to ICC jurisdiction. ° Other delegations to
the Assembly of States Parties suggest that the ICC must take no
action at all when the Security Council is silent on the matter.' This
position finds support in Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute, which
states that any provision on the crime of aggression must be
consistent with the U.N. Charter.2 Read in light of Article 39 of the
Charter, the Security Council is solely responsible for making that
determination.43
Applying this standard to the North Korean invasion of South
Korea in 1950, it is clear that the ICC-if it had existed at the time
and all jurisdictional issues were satisfied-would be able to proceed
with the investigation of the North Korean leadership. U.N. Security
Council Resolution 82, condemning North Korea's "breach of the
peace," was the only occasion the Security Council expressly declared
that a U.N. member committed aggression." The question remains
whether the ICC would have jurisdiction over similar actions that did
not warrant a Security Council resolution-Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
AGGRESSION 145, 148 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
37. Prosecutor v. Rajic, Case No. IT-95-12, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to
Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 1 13, (Sep. 13, 1996).
38. Jean Allain & John R.W.D. Jones, A Patchwork of Norms: A Commentary
on the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 8
EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 100, 106 (1997).
39. Leanza, supra note 29, at 9.
40. Id. at 14.
41. Ioana Gabriela Stancu, Defining the Crime of Aggression or Redefining
Aggression?, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION 87, 89 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
42. Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 5(2). See also Report of the Special
Working Group, supra note 29, 26.
43. U.N. Charter art. 39. See also Report of the Special Working Group, supra
note 29, 26.
44. S.C. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/RES/82 (June 25, 1950).
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in 1990, for example. The U.S. led coalition-acting under the
principle of collective self defense under article 51 of the Charter-
was acting no less lawfully without such a resolution. Should the
crimes committed by Osama Bin Laden and other leaders of al Qaeda
be less susceptible to judicial scrutiny because they do not fit
conveniently into traditional notions of State aggression?
It is cases like these that require a non-exclusive decision-making
process. While the Security Council should play the primary and
most authoritative role in such decisions, other international organs
must be permitted to make recommendations as to whether
aggression occurred. This should only occur in the event of Council
paralysis. The debate continues, however, over which U.N. body
should determine when aggression occurs when the Security Council
fails to do so.
B. When the Security Council Fails to Act
The U.N. Security Council has traditionally been the gatekeeper
of decisions relating to international peace and security. Regarding
aggression, the Rome Statute clearly raises an issue as to the overlap
of the roles of the ICC and the Security Council.45 Specifically, article
5(2) states that the definition of aggression: "shall be consistent with
the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations." 6 This
provision implies Security Council involvement, but not exclusively.
47
The issue is whether the ICC may initiate a case on aggression
without an explicit determination by the Security Council that a State
committed aggression, or whether another body is competent to make
that decision.
The Special Working Group is currently discussing two
additional options when the Security Council does not make a
determination after it has been notified by the ICC prosecutor. These
are:
Option 3: the Court may, with due regard to the provisions of
articles 12, 14 and 24 of the Charter, request the General Assembly
of the United Nations to make such a determination within [12]
months. In the absence of such a determination, the Court may
45. Leanza, supra note 29, at 12.
46. Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 5(2).
47. Mohammed M. Gomaa, The Definition of the Crime of Aggression and the
ICC Jurisdiction over that Crime, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE
CRIME OF AGGRESSION 55, 75 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
[Vol. 31:2
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proceed with the case.
Option 4: the Court may proceed if it ascertains that the
International Court of Justice has made a finding in proceedings
brought under Chapter II of its Statute that an act of aggression has
been committed by the State concerned. 48
The ICJ previously weighed in on this debate. In the Certain
Expenses case, it found that the Security Council had the primary, but
not exclusive responsibility in this area. The Court added, "[T]he
Charter made it abundantly clear that the General Assembly was also
to be concerned with international peace and security.,
49
The Chairman of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression, Christian Wenaweser, suggests that there is precedent for
the General Assembly to make recommendations when the Security
Council is silent." For example, the Uniting for Peace Resolution has
allowed the General Assembly to intervene on multiple occasions in
cases of the Council's failure to act on issues of international peace
and security." In fact, the U.S. and U.K. delegations, during the
debates prior to the adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolution,
argued that when the Security Council did not exercise its authority
the General Assembly was not precluded from using its powers under
the Charter. 2 Therefore, the Security Council has the primary, but
not exclusive, role of determining aggression.
The ICJ is better suited than the General Assembly to determine
when aggression occurs. This method is indicated in Option 4 above.
First, the Court is competent to determine such matters under article
48. Discussion Paper, supra note 25, at 4.
49. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (article 17, para. 2 of the Charter),
Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, at 151. See also Paula
Escarameia, The ICC and the Security Council on Aggression: Overlapping
Competencies?, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION 133, 137 n.4 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
50. Press Conference, supra note 20.
51. See generally Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc.
A/377(V) (Nov. 3, 1950). See also Gomaa, supra note 47, at 76, and POMPE, supra
note 4, at 42.
52. Saeid Mirzaee Yengejeh, Reflection on the Role of the Security Council in
Determining an Act of Aggression, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND
THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 125, 127-29 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
Yengejeh cites several examples when the Security Council requested General
Assembly recommendations under the Uniting for Peace authority: the Suez Canal
crisis in 1956, the Hungarian crisis in 1956, Lebanon in 1958, the Congo problem in
1960, Bangladesh in 1971, and Afghanistan in 1980. Id. at 129, n.9.
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36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ.53 Second, there is precedent for the
ICJ to make such determinations. In the Nicaragua case, the Court
had to determine whether Nicaragua committed aggressive acts
justifying the U.S. claim of self-defense.' Finally, the ICJ is the more
appropriate body due to the simple fact that it is a Court made up of
leading experts in international law. In the General Assembly,
member State representatives often base decisions on political
affiliations. For the purposes of determining whether the ICC should
proceed with a criminal investigation, only sound legal analysis will
suffice.
A Security Council resolution or an ICJ advisory opinion finding
that State aggression occurred will serve as an indispensable
precondition to the Court exercising jurisdiction. After that, the
Court may decide the extent to which an individual is culpable under
all of the circumstances of the case. This approach will enhance the
independence of the Court, since there would be no need to define
aggression if the Security Council or ICJ determinations were binding
as regards individual criminal responsibility.5
C The "Threshold"Issue
Assuming the appropriate international body determines that
aggression has been committed, the Court must then decide whether
the nature of the State conduct amounts to "aggression." This is
known as the "threshold" issue. The Chairman's Discussion Paper
includes two options which would qualify the State act of aggression
in terms of its nature or its object and result. Specifically, it states:
[An act] which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations...
such as, in particular, a war of aggression or an act which has the
object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or
annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof."
53. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 36, para. 2. See also Escarameia, supra note 49, at 137.
54. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)
[hereinafter Nicaragua Case]. See also Gomaa, supra note 47, at 76.
55. Politi, supra note 24, at 49-50.
56. Discussion Paper, supra note 25, at 3. Compare this with the Preparatory
Commission's draft, which would have included "flagrant" violations of the U.N.
Charter. PrepComm Report, supra note 23, at 3, 1.
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The first option, or the "manifest violation" requirement, finds
strong support in the Special Working Group. 7  Delegates are
confident this requirement will prevent borderline cases from going
before the Court." Others argue, however, that this clause is
unnecessary because the Court's jurisdiction is already limited to "the
most serious crimes of international concern,"59 and by the restrictive
use of the term "aggression" in the U.N. Charter."
The second option, which lists examples of the "manifest"
violations, will likely not be included in the final definition. Many
view this as unjustifiably restrictive, limiting the Court's ability to
prosecute aggression for anything short of an armed invasion."
Furthermore, the non-exhaustive nature of the list may in fact violate
the principle of legality nullum crimen sine lege (without a law there
can be no punishment).62
While these arguments seem to have the most traction, it is worth
noting that others argue that examples of the "object or result" of
aggressive acts are more in line with U.N. Charter principles. For
example, a strict interpretation of Article 2(4) of the Charter might
require that the territorial integrity and political independence of a
State "must be seriously endangered by the use of force if this is to
deserve the qualification 'aggression.'
63
Ultimately, the "object or result" language is far too limiting and,
in fact, is covered in the provision related to State acts which
constitute aggression. This is discussed in detail in the next section.
57. Press Conference, supra note 20.
58. Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 29, at 11, J 16. See also
Kevin Jon Heller, Progress on Defining the Cirne of Aggression - But at What
Price?, Opinio Juris, Feb. 27, 2007, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/
1172619774.shtml.
59. Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 1. See also Report of the Special Working
Group, supra note 29, at 11, 17.
60. Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 29, at 11, 17. See also
Heller, supra note 58.
61. Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 29, at 11, 18.
62. Id. See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI) at art. 15(1), 1496th plen. mtg. (Dec. 16, 1966) (stating "No one shall be
held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it
was committed."). See also DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 130-31.
63. POMPE, supra note 4, at 106.
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D. Exclusive v. General Definition for State Conduct
Constituting Aggression
In 1950, the North Korean armed forces invaded South Korea in
a clear violation of the U.N. Charter. They used artillery, tanks,
aircraft, and ground forces.' But what if North Korea had used
tactics never considered by the international community? Would
these actions not amount to aggression?
There has been a great deal of debate about whether to
specifically list the acts constituting aggression or to leave the
definition a general one. Three options were considered at the Rome
Conference: 1) Use an open ended, general definition; 2) combine a
general definition with an illustrative list of acts; or 3) specifically list
the acts. 5
The inability of the parties at Rome to agree on this provision is
partly responsible for the lack of a legal definition of aggression. A
general definition may be an easier method to reach agreement and it
would also allow the ICC greater flexibility in determining which acts
constitute criminal aggression. 66 This approach, however, could run
afoul of the principle of legality.67 Indeed, this is one of the primary
criticisms leveled at the post-WWII tribunals.
Even though the crime of aggression was not actually defined,
the post-war tribunals had jurisdiction over "crimes against peace."
In fact, the Dutch Judge of the Tokyo Tribunal later suggested that
aggressive war was not a crime under international law at the
beginning of the war.6' Similarly, in the Nuremberg Judgment, the
Court essentially stated that punishing crimes against peace breached
the principle nullum crimen sine lege.69 Even Robert H. Jackson,
Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, admitted in his opening statement
that the Nuremburg Charter "fails itself to define a war of
aggression."7
64. See generally 1 THE KOREAN WAR (The Korean Institute of Military History
ed., University of Nebraska Press 2000).
65. Leanza, supra note 29, at 13.
66. Politi, supra note 24, at 48.
67. Leanza, supra note 29, at 13.
68. Schabas, supra note 1, at 29 (quoting B.V.A. ROLING & ANTONIO CASSESE,
THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND 98 (1993)).
69. Id.
70. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 98-155 (1947) [hereinafter NUREMBERG JUDGMENT], available
at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/11-21-45.htm>. See also Gomnaa,
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Since then, a mixed definition of aggression was developed by
the U.N. General Assembly, but not for the purposes of individual
criminal liability.7 General Assembly Resolution 3314 (G.A. Res.
3314) was adopted in order to assist the Security Council determine
when aggression is committed.7 ' For this reason, and due to the non-
binding nature of General Assembly resolutions, some argue that
G.A. Res. 3314 may not be used by the Court to determine individual
accountability.73 This is a narrow viewpoint, which fails to consider
the impact that G.A. Res. 3314 has had on shaping the definition of
aggression. Moreover, after the ICJ decision in the Nicaragua case, at
least part of this resolution is considered customary international
law.74
Supporters of a specific list of acts argue that this approach will
avoid any breach of the principle of legality. They predict that a
general definition will not add to the effective prosecution and
punishment of the crime, but instead will lead to inconsistent Court
decisions.75 These arguments rely heavily on article 3 of G.A. Res.
3314 which lists acts of aggression, including: invasion or attack by the
armed forces of a State of the territory of another, military
occupation, annexation of territory by force, bombardment against
the territory of another State, blockades by armed force, attacking the
armed forces of another State wherever located, the use of armed
forces within a State beyond the originally agreed upon terms, one
State allowing another State to use its territory to perpetrate attacks
against a third State, sending by one State of non-state armed groups
to conduct attacks against another State.76
The draft crime submitted by the Special Working Group offers
two alternatives: a general reference to G.A. Res. 3314 or a specific
reference to the acts listed in articles 1 and 3. The relevant provision
reads as follows: "For the purpose of paragraph 1, 'act of aggression'
means an act referred to in [Articles 1 and 3 of] United Nations
supra note 47, at 61 n.20.
71. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 13.
72. See Press Conference, supra note 20. Aggression may be considered
differently for political purposes than it is when a "judicial inquiry is made into
criminal liability." DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 126.
73. Leanza, supra note 29, at 13.
74. Nicaragua Case, supra note 54. See also DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 127.
75. Politi, supra note 24, at 48.
76. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 13, at art. 3.
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General Assembly Resolution 3314(XXIX) of 14 December 1974."
77
The Chairman of the Assembly of States Parties, Ambassador
Christian Wenaweser, stated that it is still unclear, as indicated by the
brackets in the provision above, whether the acts in G.A. Res. 3314
will be specified.7 ' This would be a mistake.
Specific acts should be left out of the definition; the principle of
legality, while crucial to drafting criminal offenses, is not at issue here.
Even if questionable at the outset of Nuremberg, the criminalization
of aggression cannot be questioned today. If one looks to the
judgments of the post-WWII tribunals, and other documents
outlawing aggression (the U.N. Charter, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the
Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva Protocol, the
Resolution of the League Assembly of 24 September 1927) there can
79
be no doubt that this conduct, even if not codified, is a crime.
Furthermore, limiting the acts of aggression to a specific list
unnecessarily handicaps the effective prosecution of this crime. It is
impossible to foretell the various modalities of aggression that have
not yet come into being.
IV. Individual Criminal Responsibility
Historically, the State was the only recognized actor on the
international level. This is embodied in the U.N. Charter, where
aggression is only categorized as State conduct. 8°  Even though
individual responsibility for international crimes was seriously
considered for the first time after WWI,8 it was the Nuremberg
Tribunal that had the most lasting impact.
The Nuremberg Judgment states that, "[c]rimes against
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and
only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
provisions of international law be enforced." ' As such, this section
77. Discussion Paper, supra note 25.
78. Press Conference, supra note 20.
79. Gomaa, supra note 47, at 62.
80. .d. at 65. It is worth noting that the Security Council has cited a non-state
armed group as an aggressor in S.C. Res. 405, U.N. Doc. S/RES/405 (April 14, 1977).
In that situation, mercenaries who attacked Benin committed acts of aggression,
without specific reference to the State sponsor of the mercenaries involved. See
Gomaa, supra note 47, at 65 n. 32.
81. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 154.
82. 1 NuREMBURG JUDGMENT, supra note 70, at 223. See also Gomaa, supra
note 47, at 66, andDINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 120.
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focuses on the individual perpetrators of aggression. Specifically, the
issues are: Which persons may be held accountable for personal
jurisdiction purposes, which acts are considered criminal, and what
mental state must the perpetrator possess for criminal liability. The
objective is to draft a crime so that the Kim II Sungs, Saddam
Husseins, and Osama Bin Ladens of the world may not commit
aggression with impunity.
A. Ratione Personae - The Leadership Requirement
The ICC will only have personal jurisdiction - ratione personae-
over certain categories of individuals for the crime of aggression.
Compared to the other offenses under the Rome Statute, this type of
limited jurisdiction is unique. It is clear that not every person
involved in acts of aggression can be punished.83 The responsibility of
government decision makers is not the same as that of the soldiers on
the ground.
The post-WWII tribunals held that responsibility for the crime of
aggression was limited to political, military, economic and industry
leaders. The High Command case of the Subsequent Proceedings
ruled that the criminality of aggressive war only attaches to
"individuals at the policy-making level."'  The IG. Farben case
added industrial leaders to the list of potential defendants.85
Therefore, the crime of aggression was applicable only to high
ranking military officials, civil servants of the highest order, and
civilians holding influential positions in public affairs or the
economy.
Holding a particular office or job is not as important as the
ability to exercise the power accompanying a high level position.
Examples of the ability to exercise this power include: leadership,
policy-making, decision-making, influencing high level officials,
responsibility, authority, and discretion. 87 The 1996 ILC Draft Code
83. DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 135.
84. United States v. Von Leeb (High Command), 11 N.M.T. 462, 486
(Nuremberg 1948). See also DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 135.
85. United States v. Krauch (/G. Farben), 8 N.M.T. 1081, 1124-5 (Nuremberg
1948). See also DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 135-36.
86. DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 137 (citing T. Taylor, The Nuremburg War
Crimes Trials, 450 INT'L CON. 243, 309-10, 339 (1949)).
87. U.N. Prep. Comm. for the ICC, Working Group on the Crime of Aggression,
Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression, at 32, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1/Add.1 (April 8-19, 2002) [hereinafter Historical Revie %J.
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included individuals as leaders or organizers as subject to criminal
liability for aggression. 88 The Preparatory Commission required the
person to be in a position to effectively exercise control over or to
direct the political or military action of a State.89 The current draft
definition maintains the leadership requirement.
Chairman Wenaweser states that the negotiations so far reflect
the leadership requirement for criminal aggression. The person must
be in a position to effectively exercise control over the military or
political action of a State.9° Noticeably absent from the current draft,
however, is the ability to hold non-civil servants liable, such as private
economic actors or third-State officials. 9'
Limiting the ratione personae this way would be a step back
from the post-WWII tribunals.92  In fact, it may prohibit the
prosecution of modern forms of aggression. Consider the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Under the draft definition, a case of
criminal aggression could not be initiated against Osama Bin Laden
at the ICC - assuming all other jurisdictional requirements were met
under the Rome Statute - because he is not a political or military
leader of a State. Rather he is the leader of a non-state armed group.
Furthermore, the Taliban almost certainly would not be held
accountable, since the current draft definition of aggression does not
consider outside State support within the purview of the Court.
It is uncertain how the Special Working Group will resolve this
issue. It is particularly interesting in light of article 3(g) of G.A. Res.
3314, which specifically considers non-state armed groups' attack on
another state a form of aggression.
B. The Actus Reus for Criminal Aggression
The leaders responsible for influencing State conduct must have
exercised their power to be guilty of aggression. This is the actus reus
of the offense. The framework for this element of criminal aggression
has changed little since the post-WWII tribunals. At Nuremberg, in
order to be held criminally responsible, an individual must have been
88. 1996 ILC Draft Code, supra note 15, at 42-43.
89. PrepComm Report, supra note 23, at 3.
90. Press Conference, supra note 20.
91. See Kevin Jon Heller, Retreat From Nuremberg.- The Leadership
Requirement in the Crime of Aggression, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 3, available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/Abstract=956466.
92. Id. See also Heller, supra note 58.
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involved in the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war
of aggression." 93  The 1996 ILC Draft Code revised the level of
participation and required that the individual actively participate in
the aggression or give the orders to initiate aggressive acts.9' The
Preparatory Commission adopted similar language.95
The Special Working Group debated two variants on the acts
required for individual criminal responsibility, but agreed to Variant
A. According to Variant A, the "differentiated approach," the crime
of aggression means "the planning, preparation, initiation or
execution of an act of aggression/armed attack." 96  This variation
applies the modes of liability listed in article 25(3), subparagraphs (a)-
(d) of the Rome Statute. These include: joint criminal 'enterprise,
ordering/soliciting/inducing the commission of a crime, and aiding
and abetting.9 It is noteworthy that this variant would add paragraph
3 bis to Article 25, which re-confirms that the modes of participation
only "apply to persons being in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State." 98
Furthermore, it is clear from the negotiations that article 28 of the
Rome Statute - command responsibility - will not apply to the crime
of aggression due to the leadership nature of the crime.'
The current draft may contain similar language to the post-
WWII tribunals, but in practice is much more limiting. For example,
at Nuremberg it was considered that perpetrators could be brought to
trial under the various forms of secondary liability (i.e., joint criminal
enterprise, aiding and abetting) even if no armed conflict
93. Nuremburg Charter, supra note 11, art. 6(a). See also Historical Review,
supra note 87. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 195-207.
94. 1996 ILC Draft Code, supra note 15, at 42-3.
95. PrepComm Report, supra note 23, at 3.
96. Report of the Special Working Group, supra note 29, at 16. Compare this to
Variant B, the "monistic approach," which provides for aggression when a "person ...
orders or participates actively in the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of
an act of aggression/armed attack." Discussion Paper, supra note 25, at 3.
97. Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 25(3), subparas. (a)-(d).
98. Report of Special Working Group, supra note 29, at 16. See also Discussion
Paper, supra note 25, at 3 n.4. This note also mentions the inapplicability of article 28
of the Rome Statute to the crime of aggression, because of the leadership nature of
the offense. Id.
99. Discussion Paper, supra note 25, at 3 n. 4. The Preparatory Commission also
discussed excluding article 28 of the Rome Statute as it applies to aggression, but also
considered scrapping articles 25(3) and 33 for the same reasons. PrepComm Report,
supra note 23, at 3.
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materialized.' No matter how unlikely this scenario,'1 it is a far cry
from the Special Working Group's draft, which does not even
consider threats of aggression or attempts as acts constituting
unlawful aggression.'O°
C. The Mens Rea Requirement: Intent and Knowledge
Every crime has two primary elements, the actus reus, discussed
above, and the mens rea, covered here. The post-WWII tribunals
considered knowledge an essential element of individual criminal
responsibility for aggression. The level of knowledge depended on
the stage at which the individual participated in aggressive war."'
Hence, a leading military or political figure who orders rearmament
with no intent to participate in aggressive acts, or knowledge of such
plans, cannot be culpable of the crime of aggression.' " This type of
activity often occurs during peacetime. But if the individual acts with
knowledge that aggression is planned, then that person possesses the
requisite mens rea.15
The mens rea requirement in recent drafts of aggression,
however, is often treated as part and parcel to the act itself, if it is
mentioned at all. For example, article 16 of the 1996 ILC Draft Code
does not mention a mental state requirement.10 The Preparatory
Commission used an "intentionally and knowingly" standard. 7
Similarly, the Special Working Group's draft specifies the requisite
mental state in the "Elements of the crime of aggression" section.'0s
Knowledge or intent is required in four distinct areas. First, the
perpetrator must have "knowingly" been in the position of leadership
and control."M Second, the "planning, preparation or execution of the
act of aggression" must have been done "with intent and
100. DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 135.
101. See P.C. Jessup, The Crime of Aggression and the Future of International
Law, 62 P.S.Q. 1, 8 (1947).
102. Threats of aggression were punishable at the Subsequent Proceedings at
Nuremberg. Dinstein, supra note 11, at 132. See also Press Conference, supra note 20.
103. BROWNLIE supra note 4, at 167-75.
104. High Command, supra note 84, at 488.
105. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 70, at 282-84. See also Dinstein, supra note
11, at 140.
106. 1996 ILC Draft Code, supra note 15, at 42-43.
107. PrepComm Report, supra note 23, at 3.
108. Discussion Paper, supra note 25, at 4.
109. Id.
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knowledge."'1 ° Third, the perpetrator must have known "that the
actions of the State amounted to aggression."'.. Finally, the
perpetrator had "intent and knowledge" that the act was a flagrant
violation of the U.N. Charter."2 While these requirements may seem
a bit overlapping, the Chairperson noted that the "elements" section
of the draft crime had not been thoroughly reviewed by the Special
Working Group. "
As it stands, an expressed mens rea requirement may not be
necessary depending on the outcome of the "threshold" issue
discussed in Section III, C above. If the Assembly of States Parties
accepts that a person commits aggression by planning, preparing,
initiating or executing acts "such as, in particular, a war of aggression
or an act which has the object or result of establishing a military
occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part
thereof," then there is little need for further elaboration.' This
formulation necessarily requires the perpetrator of aggression to
intend to occupy or annex another State's territory.
The requisite intent can, therefore, be inferred from the use of
force directed against the territorial integrity or political
independence of a State."' Critics of this approach argue that intent
for the purposes of criminal aggression is too important to leave to an
inference and should be expressly provided for in the definition."6
Furthermore, it is argued that listing the "object or result" is unduly
restrictive since it would be impossible to list all of the unlawful
117purposes.
The mens rea element should be expressed without referring to
the "object or result" requirement. It should be included in the
definition itself and not be relegated to the elements section alone.
Currently, the draft elements section requires the perpetrator to have
knowledge over too many aspects of the crime, such as, knowingly
having a position of leadership or knowledge that the acts committed
were a manifest violation of the Charter. The definition would add
110. Id. at 5.
111. Id.
112. Discussion Paper, supra note 25, at 5.
113. Id. at 4 n.6.
114. Id. at 3.
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great clarity to this element if it required simply that the "planning,
preparation or execution of the act of aggression was committed with
intent and knowledge."
V. Recommendations and Conclusion
The inherently political nature of defining the crime of
aggression cannot be ignored. As stated by Mr. Wenewaser after the
January 2007 meeting of the Special Working Group, "it was all very
legal and very complex and very fascinating, but in the end it's a
political question." 8 But after sixty years without an enforceable
definition of aggression, the stakes could not be higher. As stated by
Yoram Dinstein:
Only if it dawns on the actual decision-makers that when they carry
their country along the path of war in contravention of
international law they expose themselves to individual criminal
liability, are they likely to hesitate before taking the fateful step.19
The efforts of the Special Working Group to define the crime of
aggression are heading in this direction. In order to make the most of
this historic opportunity to criminalize aggressive conduct, the
following recommendations should be implemented. First, the
definition should not limit the Court's jurisdiction when the Security
Council fails to act. The ICC is not an organ of the United Nations,
although they have a special relationship. But the inherently political
nature of the Security Council's decision making - something
resulting in no action - should not prevent the Court from seeking
justice. Determining when State conduct amounts to aggression is
within the authority of the ICJ, which has handled similar issues in
the past. Absent Security Council action, there is no reason why the
ICJ cannot play a supporting role in making this determination.
Second, the threshold issue should be resolved by stating that
acts which are "manifest violations" of the U.N. Charter constitute
aggression. This is consistent with the Rome Statute's desire to try
only "the most serious crimes of international concern," 20 and
provides the Court sufficient flexibility on this issue, unlike the
"object or result" standard.
Third, consistent with the "threshold" issue, State acts of
118. Press Conference, supra note 20.
119. DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 117.
120. Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 1.
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aggression should not be specifically listed in the Rome Statute.
General Assembly Resolution 3314, which provides an illustrative list
of prohibited acts, will be referenced. This is sufficient to guide the
judge in determining what types of acts typically constitute aggression
without removing the possibility of other, non-specified State acts
that would also manifestly violate the U.N. Charter.
Finally, the crime of aggression should only be applied to
individuals who are in a position to exercise their power. This
includes military, political, and, as Kevin Heller suggests, influential
private actors. This standard is consistent with Nuremberg and
encapsulates those who realistically may be responsible for acts of
aggression. Additionally, the actus reus element should remain
unchanged, as it largely reflects the jurisprudence of the post-WWII
tribunals, even if a bit more restrictive. Completing the definition,
the mens rea element should be stated upfront, in the definition itself,
and should be an intent and knowledge requirement.
Implementing these recommendations is merely a starting point.
The Special Working Group is on the verge of drafting a strong,
enforceable definition of aggression, which will encompass the full
range of aggressive conduct existent today while leaving room to
interpret aggression as it may manifest in the future. Perhaps an
international criminal court with jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression would have deterred Kim I1 Sung and his advisors from
ordering the invasion of South Korea. Likewise, Saddam Hussein
may not have occupied and annexed Kuwait in 1990 if he thought it
would result in life imprisonment in The Hague. Hopefully, the
definition of aggression will be interpreted by the ICC to include the
crimes committed by the leaders of non-state armed groups and the
States who sponsor them, as in the case of al Qaeda and the former
Taliban regime.
The success of any definition of aggression must be judged in
time. In fact, the Court may not initiate action for aggressive conduct
occurring prior to 2009 at the earliest, since the crime will not be
retroactive. 2' After that, if the crime of aggression is effectively
prosecuted causing leaders to modify their behavior and stop using
aggression as an extension of State policy, then the ICC will have
succeeded in this endeavor. It would be tragic, however, if this crime
is never prosecuted because there is no determination of aggressive
121. Press Conference, supra note 20.
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State conduct, or States are clever enough to commit aggressive acts
which do not fall within the purview of the definition. In either case,
the next sixty years will prove just as challenging as the last.
